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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of the late 2000’s has had a devastating effect on the US economy. The 
economics that explains the amplification of such crises pertains to the financial accelerator 
model, which states that the supply of and demand for credit depends on interest rates or the 
credit rationing model, which suggests that credit is always rationed and interest rates have little 
or no effect on it.  In this paper, we look at the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation 
for large and small firms on a monthly and a quarterly basis. In addition, we also look at the 
impact of the current recession on the cost of credit intermediation for small as well as large 
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INTRODUCTION  
New Institutional Theories argue that it is conceptually wrong and misleading from a policy 
perspective to treat micro variables as constant when analyzing economic relationships at the 
macro level. For example, many economists assume that the cost of credit intermediation is the 
same for small firms as well as large firms when analyzing the macro economy.  In the credit 
market, however, there are informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. This 
gives rise to two main problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. The idea of adverse 
selection deals with the notion that lenders are wary of giving away credit to borrowers because 
of the high default risk. The idea of moral hazard, on the other hand, deals with the notion that 
the lenders assume the downside risk of an investment made by a borrower on the amount 
borrowed.  
Because of these problems in the credit market, lenders differentiate between borrowers and 
disburse most funds to those borrowers who are deemed to be “credit-worthy”. There are two 
theories based on the equilibrium quantity of funds. The financial accelerator model (Bernanke, 
et al, 1981) contends that the cost of credit is price-based, and that a relatively “credit unworthy” 
borrower has to pay higher prices to get the same level of credit as compared to a “credit worthy” 
borrower. The other theory, which is dubbed the Credit Rationing Model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981), argues that credit is rationed, and that due to this unworthy [and potentially worthy] 
borrowers do not get or have minimal access to credit. The theory also contends that the 
equilibrium interest rate is not at the market-clearing level, but at a level where the return to the 
lenders is the highest.    
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The main argument of these two models is that it is easier for big and well-established firms to 
get access to credit as compared to small firms , i.e. that the cost of credit intermediation is lower 
for large firms or that large firms aren’t rationed whereas small firms are.  These models also 
argue that during a recession, the difference in the price of credit intermediation for large firms 
and small firms increases and this exacerbates recession. The models also argue that during a 
recession, the cost of credit intermediation for large and so-called “worthy” borrowers decreases, 
but it doesn’t decrease for “unworthy” or potentially worthy borrowers, i.e. small firms. Since 
small firms do not get access to credit, these firms are forced to cut back on their investing 
spending. As a result, we observe the exacerbation of a recession. 
A lot of literature has been generated by these two theories. One of the more recent ones, by 
Walker (2010), tests these two theories. In his paper, “Costs of short-term credit for small and 
large firms”, he explores the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation for small and 
large firms in the short-run. He also explores the impact of these factors on the cost of credit 
intermediation for small firms as well as large firms in the long-run. In addition, he examines the 
impact of recession on these factors as well as the prices that firms pay for credit.     
In our paper, we will follow Walker’s (2010) lead, and test the Financial Accelerator Model and 
Credit Rationing Model. The time period of our analysis will be from 1998 to 2011. We will 
analyze the cost of credit intermediation for small and large firms, examining what factors are 
responsible for their changes in the short run as well as the long run. We will also analyze 
whether changes in the cost of credit intermediation are significantly different during a recession 
as compared to periods of normalcy. The main goal of this research will be to test if the presence 
of agency costs, as implied by the Credit Rationing Model and the Financial Accelerator Model, 
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affect small and large firms differently. This line of inquiry leads to another important question, 
are loanable funds markets for small and large firms segmented or do all firms compete for the 
same pool of credit? The main variables that will be considered are the cost of credit 
intermediation for small as well as large firms, and the quantity of credit obtained by these firms.     
 
 



















   
CHAPTER 1: THEORY REVIEW 
1.1 New Institutional Theories of Finance  
New Institutional Theories of Finance are based on the market failures inside the financial 
system. They study the macroeconomic implications of the financial world through the 
microeconomic behavior of households, firms, financial markets and banks. In the past, 
Keynesian and New Classical models have ignored the complexities of the interactions at the 
firm level. To simply assume uniformity at the micro-level when considering the macro-
economy leads to the ignoring of crucial macroeconomic implications. (Knoop, 2008) 
The Keynesian and New Classical models consider liquidity, but they fail to distinguish credit 
from liquidity. Liquidity deals with the total amount of funds available to lenders. The change in 
liquidity occurs when there are changes in the money supply or the level of savings in the 
economy. Liquidity is usually measured by the money supply. On the other hand, there are 
difficulties when measuring credit, since it deals with the amount of loanable funds that the 
financial institutions are willing and able to provide. Another important distinction between 
liquidity and credit is the idea of perceived default risk. This idea is more important for the 
provision of credit than the interest rate. With respect to this difference between liquidity and 
credit, the New Institutional theories of Finance argue that credit may be high when the supply of 
money is low and vice-versa. (Knoop, 2008) 
Another main idea related to the New Institutional Theories of Finance is the idea of information 
asymmetry. Financial markets are imperfect; hence the idea of informational asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders comes into play. This exists because borrowers are more informed about 
their credit worthiness than the lenders. If the borrower can convince the lender that he is credit 
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worthy, even if he is not, he gets access to credit. On the other hand, if the borrower cannot show 
he is credit worthy no matter how credit worthy he is, he still fails to get access to credit. (Knoop, 
2008) 
One of the two main problems that arise from the imperfections of financial markets is the 
problem of adverse selection. As we know, borrowers with high default risk are more likely to 
search for loans since they want to take risks with their own funds as well as others’ funds. Since 
lenders are aware of this problem, they are usually not willing to provide credit to everyone who 
applies for it. (Knoop, 2008) 
The second major problem is referred to as moral hazard. Moral hazard deals with the risky 
behavior by the borrower who gained access to credit. The rationale behind this idea is pretty 
simple: for the borrower who has been provided credit, the lender assumes part of the downside 
risk. On the other hand, if the project is successful, the upside benefit is not distributed in the 
same way. The borrower simply needs to return the amount that he had promised to return, and 
the remaining profit goes to him. Since there is protection on the downside, and profit in the 
upside, borrowers are likely to engage in riskier behavior.  
These two problems are factors that determine the supply of credit. Due to these problems, the 
quality of information on the part of the borrower is directly proportional to the amount of credit 
that the borrower is provided and inversely proportional to the price that the borrower has to pay 
to get access to credit. Therefore, small or new firms are at a major disadvantage compared to 
big and established firms. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
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Since the provision of credit depends upon moral hazard and adverse selection, and not 
necessarily upon the interest rates, the credit market is almost always in disequilibrium: supply 
for loanable funds rarely equal the demand for loanable funds. (Knoop, 2008) 
There are two main models that are derived from the ideas discussed above: the Financial 
Accelerator Model and the Credit Rationing Model. We will now look at these two models in 
detail.  
1.2 The Financial Accelerator Model  
The Financial Accelerator Model examines how the asymmetric information due to imperfection 
in the financial market exacerbates a financial downturn. Bernanke and Gertler, in their seminal 
1996 paper, argue that the cost of credit intermediation of firms, households, and individuals 
affects the level of credit in the economy. Consequently, small microeconomic changes can have 
a big impact on the economy. (Bernanke et al, 1996)  
According to Bernanke and Gertler, the cost of credit intermediation is partly related to interest 
rates. The cost of providing information is significant. In this model access to financial 
information is costly. In addition, the borrowers also have to face monitoring costs as well as the 
opportunity cost of collaterals in some cases. (Bernanke et al, 1996) 
As a result of the costs associated with credit, firms seek to finance their projects internally, via 
retained earnings. If firms require more finance, they issue debt. If this is not an option for them, 
they prefer to raise equity. However, raising equity has serious consequences since re-issuance of 
equity dilutes ownership and might send signals to the public that the stock is overvalued, which 
is harmful for the firm. (Knoop, 2008) 
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Bernanke and Gertler argue that the cost of credit intermediation is a function of the financial 
fundamentals of both borrowers and lenders. They argue that the cost of credit intermediation 
does not necessarily depend on debt levels as long as the borrowers have assets that can be 
collaterized. In other words, their net worth (total assets – total liabilities) is what the creditors 
look at. This determines the financial fundamentals of borrowers. (Bernanke et al, 1996) 
To see this, let us assume that we are in a recession, which has hurt a firm’s sales. This has a 
negative impact on the net worth of the firm. Since the net worth of the firm has decreased, 
lenders would be reluctant to provide this firm with credit. Therefore, the cost of credit for the 
firm increases, either through an increase in the interest rate, the increase in the collateral that 
firms have to provide in order to obtain credit, or the increase in the information required for 
firms to get credit. Let us remember that this occurs when the firms need credit the most. The 
inaccessibility of credit would lead to a decrease in the consumption and investment of firms. 
This decrease would, then, worsen the recession. (Knoop, 2008)   
Let us consider the Economic Model in Fig 1.1. Now let us assume that a recession has occurred. 
Due to the recession, the money supply decreases unexpectedly. In addition, there is a decline in 
expectations, which reduces consumption and investment, and an increase in perceived risk. 
These three factors lead to the shifting of the aggregate demand. In addition, due to the higher 
costs of credit intermediation, the aggregate demand falls even more. On the other hand, because 
of the higher risk factor and the decrease in capacity (due to the fall in investment), the aggregate 
supply shifts upwards to the left.  Thus, the equilibrium output is Y3 in figure 1.1. (Knoop, 2008)   
13 
   
 
Fig 1.1: Impact of the Financial Accelerator Model on the Economy. (Source: Knoop, 2008)    
 
1.3 The Credit Rationing Model 
The Credit Rationing Model suggests that credit is rationed and that access to credit is not 
affected by the interest rate. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
Let us see the perspective of the borrower in this model. The borrower defaults on his loan as 
long as his return from the project and his collateral is less than the amount he has to pay back 
(which is the loan with interest). Thus, the payoff to the borrower would be the greater of the 
following: the return from the project minus the loan and interest or the collateral that he will 
give away if the loan defaults. The return to the bank, on the other hand, will be the smaller of 
the following: the return of the project and the collateral (if the borrower defaults) or the loan 
and interest rate (if the borrower pays back). (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
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Fig 1.2: Firms’ Profit Functions (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)        
From figure 1.2 and the ideas discussed above, we can see that the borrower has downside 
protection. Whatever the firm’s payoff from the project, the maximum it can lose is the collateral 
(-C in Figure 1.2). In addition its break-even point will be where the return from the project 
equals the amount of the loan with interest and the collateral. (R= (1+r)B – C in Figure 1.2). 
However, as we can see in Figure 1.2, there is no ceiling to the firm’s profit. This is why high-
risk borrowers are interested in borrowing from the banks. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
Let us consider the case of an increase in the interest rates. Risk-averse borrowers will borrow 
only up to a certain interest rate, after which only the high-risk borrowers will borrow. Because 
of this the profit of the bank will decrease once the risk-averse or the “safe” borrowers pull out. 
This is shown in figure 1.3. We can see a sudden drop in the bank’s profit (ρ) at interest rate r1. 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
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Figure 1.3: Financial institutions’ profit function in terms of interest rates. (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)  
This outcome leads to a theorem derived by Stiglitz and Weiss, which say that the profit function 
for financial institutions is not a monotonic function of interest rates. There is a particular r*, the 
interest rate, such that the bank will maximize its returns if it charges its borrowers this interest 
rate. Therefore, banks will provide credit at the interest rates r*.  However, we can see that at this 
interest rate, there is an excess demand for credit. Therefore we do not reach the market clearing 
condition for credit. Hence, we can see that credit is rationed, and that all who are in need of 
credit for do not have access to it. This is shown in figure 1.4. In the figure we can see that the 
market clearing condition is at the interest rate rm but the equilibrium is at r^*. At this 
equilibrium it is evident that there is an excess demand: borrowers are willing and able to borrow 
more at a higher interest rate. Since it is not profitable for the lender to do so, he will not provide 
credit at a higher interest rate. It is also evident that the lender maximizes its returns when it 
provides credit at r^*. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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Figure 1.4: The loanable funds market with the lender’s profit function. (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
The rationing of credit leads us to an important question: if credit is rationed, how do banks 
differentiate credit-worthy customers from the ones that are not credit worthy? Large and well-
established firms have access to credit, and small firms, which are usually private, might not 
have access to credit all the time.  
The idea of credit limits is important here. Large firms have higher credit limits than small firms 
(Knoop, 2008).  The role of credit limits is very important in the credit-rationing model. 
According to this model, a small shock to the economy will not have a significant impact on 
credit as long as the borrowers are well within their credit limits. It is only when the borrowers 
are near their credit limits that a small shock will lead to a large reduction in credit available to 
them. During a recession, the credit limits of borrowers are lowered. Thus firms that are in need 
of credit do not have access to credit. The credit limit is tighter for newer, smaller, and private 
firms in comparison with well-established, larger, and public firms. (Knoop, 2008) The recession 
gets escalated in the same way as described in the Financial Accelerator Model. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, both the financial accelerator model and the credit-
rationing model help explain the exacerbation of economic downturns. However, these models 
have overlooked some factors related to credit intermediation. This idea will be explored in this 
chapter.  
The financial accelerator model suggests that after an adverse macroeconomic shock, borrowers 
will have access to a lower amount of credit, and due to this, their economic activity will also 
decline. This is explained by the presence of agency costs. In a recession, due to the presence of 
higher agency costs, the borrowers (small-sized firms) face a greater decline in their spending 
and production, and also their revenue than borrowers (large-sized firms) who do not have such 
difficulty in obtaining credit. Therefore, the theory predicts that large size firms (who have 
access to credit) and small size firms who are subject to agency costs are affected differently in 
an economic downturn. If some firms rely entirely on internal funding and require zero credit, 
then the financial accelerator model doesn’t come into play. (Bernanke et al, 1993) 
Ben Bernanke et al (1993) have actually explained this phenomenon and tested the model with 
quarterly data pertaining to small and large-scale firms in the manufacturing industry. The 
authors differentiated between large-scale and small-scale firm on the basis of sales. In their 
paper, “The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality” (1993), they analyzed three 
variables for these firms: short-term debt, sales, and inventories between the time period of 1979 
and 1992. They found substantial differences between these variables pertaining to large firms in 
comparison with the variables pertaining to smaller firms.   (Bernanke et al, 1993) We can 
observe these differences in the graph below.  
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Fig 2.1: The difference between small and large firm cumulative growth rates: a comparison of industry adjusted vs. 
unadjusted data.  (Source: Bernanke, et al 1993) 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Glichrist also examined the commercial paper spread.  During conditions 
of tightened money supply and/or access to credit, firms switched from borrowing to issuing 
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commercial paper. When firms are in need of short-term credit they prefer to use commercial 
paper rather than depend on intermediated credit. However, only high-grade borrowers (large 
well-established firms) have greater access to commercial paper market and they get funds more 
easily than low-grade borrowers (small firms).  It is the case that small firms cannot use 
commercial paper to acquire funding and they rely on intermediated credit. Thus, this is 
consistent with the financial accelerator model.   (Bernanke et al, 1993) 
The theory also discusses how access to credit changes as a function of the intensity of the 
recession. When an economy is in a deep recession, the difficulty of obtaining credit for firms is 
going to be more than in a “not-so-deep recession” and this relationship is not linear. Therefore, 
deep recessions are amplified more than proportionately than not-so-deep recessions due to the 
availability of credit. 
Although this model generally states how costs of credit intermediation affect large firms and 
small firms differently in a period of economic downturn, this model doesn’t take into 
consideration the possibility of a deflation independent of an economic downturn. In a period of 
deflation, we do see the net worth of firms decreasing and this is independent of the change in 
aggregate output. (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) 
When there is an unanticipated fall in the price level, even if there is no recession, a borrower’s 
net worth decreases. Because of this previously credit-worthy borrowers become “uncredit-
worthy.” These “uncredit-worthy” borrowers suddenly find themselves without funds to generate 
their investments. As a result, the total level of investment in the economy decreases, and this 
has negative effects on the aggregate supply as well as the aggregate demand. Therefore, this 
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phenomenon helps an economy plunge into an economic downturn. The same analysis can be 
applied to households.     
In his analysis of the non-monetary based explanation of the financial crisis during the great 
depression, Bernanke argues that the reduction in money supply was an unsatisfactory 
explanation to the fall in output. Furthermore, he argues that during the recession, the banking 
crises increased the cost of credit intermediation, and that higher costs of credit intermediation 
had a relationship with the decline in aggregate output. (Bernanke, 1983) 
He argues that depositors withdrew their deposits during the crisis fearing runs. This action, 
along with the financial institutions’ desire to have liquid assets led to a “contraction” of their 
role in credit intermediation. This contraction greatly affected the class of borrowers, which 
includes households, farmers, unincorporated businesses, and small corporations. In addition, he 
also mentions that the demand-side of the economy was also affected by the higher costs of 
credit intermediation. Higher borrowing costs meant that households were forced to decrease 
their demand for current goods and services. This implies a downward shift of the aggregate 
demand, resulting in lower output.  (Bernanke, 1983) 
Craig Hakkiko and Troy Davig have extended this study in an attempt to explore the effect of 
financial stress on economic activity. In addition to the financial accelerator model, they have 
also described the “real options theory” as a theory that helps describe the connection between 
financial stress and economic activity. According to the real options theory, during financial 
stress, uncertainty is high. Thus, it is profitable to wait until the economy goes to a stage of less 
uncertainty. Hence, investors prefer to wait than invest in a period of stress. On the contrary, 
when the economy is in a period of low uncertainty (when it is not under financial stress), 
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extreme outcomes are very unlikely. Thus, there is no point waiting in order to carry out projects. 
(Davig and Hakkio, 2010)  
Hakkiko and Davig test their data using the Regime-Switching model, for two periods, distressed 
and normal. The variables they used were the Kansas City Federal Reserve’s Financial Stress 
Index (KCFSI) to measure financial stress, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) 
to measure economic activity. They found that there was a negative correlation between KCFSI 
and CFNAI in both periods, but the correlation was higher, in absolute terms, during the 
distressed regime. They also noticed that the volatility of both KCFSI and CFNAI were higher in 
the distressed regime than in the normal regime. (Davig and Hakkio, 2010) 
In addition, according to their findings, when the probability of distress regime approaches one, 
the CFNAI is lower than the KCFSI, and CFNAI is higher than the KCFSI when the probability 
of distress regime approaches 0. The difference in absolute values in CFNAI and KCFSI is 
higher when the probability of distress regime approaches 1. (Davig and Hakkio, 2010) This is 
shown in Fig 2.2  
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Fig 2.2: Probability that the Economy is in the Distressed Regime 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, and Troy David and Craig 
Hakkiko 
 
The credit-rationing model, as has been discussed, states that credit is rationed, and access to 
credit doesn’t depend on the cost of credit intermediation.  Stiglitz and Weiss, by proving a 
number of theorems, have shown that credit is rationed, and the optimal quantity of credit is not 
at the equilibrium, but rather at a point where the return to the financial institution is the greatest.  
Stilgitz and Weiss, by building on the ideas of informational asymmetry, moral hazard, and 
adverse selection proved the following: 
1. “For a given interest rate r*, there is a critical value of t (project) such that a firm will 
only borrow if and only if the project is greater than the critical value.”  
2. “As the interest rate increases the critical value of t increases.”  
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3. “The expected return on a loan to a bank is a decreasing function of the riskiness of the 
loan.” 
4. If the types of borrowers are different, then the profit function for the financial institution 
will not be a monotonic function because when groups of borrowers drop out of the 
market (due to mostly changes in the interest rate), the profit drops.  
5. “As the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds decreases.” However, 
since this theory entails interest rates being sticky, interest rates do not change as long as 
there is credit rationing.  
Note: For the diagrams explaining this phenomenon, please look at section 1, figures, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.  
Stilgitz and Weiss also introduce the idea of collateral requirements in their analysis. When the 
demand for credit increases, financial institutions might not necessarily increase their collateral 
requirements, thus reducing their rate of default because this action may not necessarily mean 
that these institutions will experience an increase in their returns. This is because smaller firms 
have small projects that have a high probability of failure. If the financial institutions increase the 
collateral requirements, smaller firms may still be able to meet those requirements and gain 
access to credit. However, since these projects have a higher probability of failure, increasing the 
collateral requirement may lead to an increase in the riskiness of the loans. 
Stiglitz and Weiss’ seminal paper is primarily a theoretical contribution and in it they do not test 
their theories empirically. Although it is a formidable task to test whether credit rationing occurs 
or not (since financial institutions seldom give out information about their credit policies), many 
economists have tried to address this issue. In their paper “Do Firms Get the Financing They 
Want?”, Alec R. Leveson and Kristen L. Willard test whether credit rationing really exists.  
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In their paper, they test their hypothesis that credit rationing does not exist. They tackle the 
ambiguity associated with credit rationing. They refute the notion that firms that were 
discouraged from applying due to the fear that their application will get rejected do not belong to 
the firms that are credit-rationed. Furthermore, they introduce the idea of time in terms of credit 
rationing, which had been ignored by Stiglitz and Weiss in their analysis. Furthermore, Leveson 
and Willard argue that firms that did not gain access to credit in the time they wanted to but got 
the required funds eventually cannot be characterized as credit-rationed firms.  
In their analysis, Willard and Leveson found out that 6.36 percent of the U.S. small businesses 
during the period of 1987-88 had an “unfulfilled desire for credit”. But these firms only 
accounted for 3.22 percent of the total sales and 3.46 percent of the total employment among all 
firms that were included in the study. Of the 6.36 percent of the firms that were rationed, only 
about a third of these firms were denied credit. The remaining either didn’t apply or got the funds 
eventually. This result along with the negative correlation between firm size and credit denial 
suggests that the credit-rationing model may not work in real life. (Levenson and Willard, 2009) 
The two theories also discuss how the bank lending is being reduced either through the credit-
rationing mechanism or the rise in interest rates during economic downturns. However, it is 
imperative for us to take into account why there exists a decline in bank lending during 
recessions. In a study done by Jim Wilkinson and Jon Christensson of the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve in 2011, there was evidence that changes in bank capital and problem assets affected the 
amount of bank lending during the recent “Great” recession. The study observed that raising the 
bank capital requirement would be effective as a policy instrument. If there is a rise in bank 
capital, however, it might still not be the case that small businesses will get access to credit.  
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Although the financial accelerator model and the credit rationing models imply that small firms 
find it difficult and costly to get access to credit during times of economic downturn, both of 
these theories fail to consider the possibility that there is a weak demand for credit from qualified 
small business owners. It might be the case that the small firms do not want access to credit, 
under any cost, because they fear weak sales and poor prospects. Therefore, they plan to cut back 
their operations rather than expand them. According to the survey by the National Federation of 
Independent Businesses, twenty-seven percent of the firms were concerned about bad sales, 
whereas only three percent were worried about not being able to get access to credit. In addition, 
although recessions “are likely” to decrease the firms’ internal finance, it might be the case that 
firms, at least in a particular area, had no access to credit markets not just only during recessions, 
but all the time. (Wilkinson and Christensson, 2011) 
Some economists have also argued that there is a relationship between the debt capacity of a firm 
and cost of asset sales, and debt capacity deteriorates during a recession. They attribute the 
notion of asset illiquidity to this problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that in an economic 
downturn, small firms have trouble meeting debt payments and their assets are usually liquidated 
and sold. The highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are usually competitor firms. 
During financial distress, the competitor firms are unlikely to raise enough capital to purchase 
the other firms’ assets. As a result, assets would be sold to industry-outsiders who do not manage 
these assets as well as the firms that are in the industry. Due to this reason, the industry-outsiders 
would have to hire specialists to operate those assets. They also wouldn’t know the actual value 
for the asset. Thus they fear paying higher costs in regard to buying and operating the assets. As 
a result, they buy the assets in a price below what could have been the price paid if the asset were 
to be used inside the industry. This increases costs for the already credit-constrained firms, 
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reduces their net worth, and decreases their debt capacity. As a result, they will face higher costs 
of credit intermediation and this amplifies the downturn. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) 
Kitoyaki and Moore (1997) explain this idea through what they call the predator-prey model. 
They describe the debt levels of a firm as the predator and its landholdings as the prey. They 
argue that given a rise in a firm’s landholdings, it’s net worth increases, which allows it to 
borrow more. On the other hand, higher debt levels decrease the funds that are available to the 
firm and might imply liquidation and forced selling of the land. Kiyotaki and Moore also take 
into consideration the price of land, which causes the economy to react more to a shock. 
(Kiyotaki and More, 1997) 
The idea of the economy falling into pieces after a financial crisis is also explored by Hall (2010). 
In his paper, Hall introduces the idea of “financial friction”, which deals with a cost to one side 
of the transaction which is not a benefit to the other side of the transaction. He also argues that 
financial friction has the same effect on the economy as a property tax on capital. In addition, he 
claims that the events in September 2008 led to an increase in credit spreads, which is consistent 
with the financial accelerator model. Furthermore, he argues that a critical component of the 
credit spread is financial friction. He also underscores the idea that the rise in credit spread led to 
the widespread of credit rationing, and this resulted in the diminishment of the firms’ ability to 
finance the “acquisition of capital goods”, which in turn resulted in the cutback of all types of 
investment in the economy. Thus, the recession persisted.       
Until this point, we have been discussing economic downturns under the assumption that the 
financial institutions themselves are not adversely affected by the downturn. In those recessions, 
as we have discussed above, financial institutions did give out credit to businesses even if the 
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credit was either rationed or there were higher costs of credit intermediation. The reason for this 
was that investors withdrew their wealth from securities and deposited it in banks. But what if 
financial institutions are at the center of an economic downturn? In a recent study done by the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, it is suggested that during financial institutions-centered 
financial crises, the financial institutions that supply credit found it “harder to attract deposits”. 
In addition, it is believed that depositors looked for safer ways to invest, such as the US Treasury 
Bonds. This is consistent with the theory of “flight to safety”. Therefore the level of credit 
supplied in such recessions will be less than the level of credit supplied in other recessions. This 
implies that in such recessions, the financial accelerator model tends to exacerbate the economic 
downturn even more. (Mora, 2010)  
Furthermore, it is imperative for us to take into account why there was a decline in bank lending 
during recent recessions. Changes in both bank capital and problem assets appeared to play a role 
in the decline in bank lending during the recent “Great” recession. In a test done by Wilkinson 
and Christensson, they have shown that during the recent recession and financial crisis, business 
lending by community banks had decreased by sixteen percent. During this period, problem 







   
CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the cost of credit is different for large firms and small 
firms. The primary motive of this paper is to examine whether the difference in cost of credit 
intermediation between small and large firms is significant in periods of recession as well as 
other periods.  
It is also a formidable task to obtain data pertaining to the cost of credit intermediation for small 
as well as large firms. Therefore, proxies have been used to represent cost of credit 
intermediation for the firms. In order to search for suitable proxies, it must be evident that they 
are highly correlated with the cost of credit intermediation for large as well as small-sized firms. 
(Walker, 2009) It has been argued in this paper that large firms are usually credit worthy, and 
credit worthy borrowers usually borrow at the prime rate. Therefore the Prime Rate has been 
used as a proxy for the cost of credit intermediation for large firms. The Prime Rate is used as a 
proxy for the analysis of both monthly variables as well as quarterly variables (PRIMONTH and 
PRIQ, respectively). In addition, it has also been argued that cost of credit intermediation is 
higher for smaller firms. The cost of credit intermediation for small and independent firms is a 
mixture of the interest rate they pay on short-term interest rates and the interest rate they pay on 
credit card.  According to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, 92 percent of 
small businesses/firms use one or more credit cards. Thus, the interest rate on credit cards 
(CREDCARDQ), released by the Federal Reserve, has been used as a proxy for the cost of credit 
intermediation for small firms.  However, these rates are only generated by the Federal Reserve 
on a quarterly basis (Feb, May, Aug, and Nov of every year). In order to compare the cost 
differentials on a monthly basis, the paper uses actual monthly interest rate paid by small 
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businesses on short term loans (INTRM), generated by the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses. (Walker, 2009)  The time period for the analysis is from January 1998 to December 
2011. These variables are endogenous, whereas the other variables, which are discussed in this 
chapter, will be tested for weak exogeneity.  
Before specifying the model, it was imperative that the data be tested for non-stationarity. This 
needed to be done because: 
a. When we deal with a non-stationary time series, it is possible for us to study its behavior 
only for a particular period under consideration since each period will be a different 
episode, which cannot be generalized for other periods. Therefore, a non-stationary time 
series will not be of much use for forecasting purposes. 
b. If we are dealing with two or more time series and run Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression, it might lead to spurious regressions. Spurious regressions occur when we get 
a very high R-squared and significant t-statistics for the regression coefficients. However, 
these results are not reliable since OLS assumes that the time series are stationary.  
(Gujarati, 2011)  
One of the methods of testing for non-stationarity is the unit root test. The Augmented-Dickey 
Fuller Test is used to detect whether the time series in question are non-stationary or not.  
The series, PRIMONTH, PRIQ, INTRM, and CREDCARDQ will be tested for non-stationarity. 
The three equations used to test for non-stationarity are given below:   
1. ∆Yt = β1 + β2t +  β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 +  β5 ∆Yt-2  +….+  βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for random walk 




   
2. ∆Yt = β1 + β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 +  β5 ∆Yt-2  +….+  βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for a random walk with 
drift) 
3. ∆Yt = β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 +  β5 ∆Yt-2  +….+  βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for a random walk)  
Where Y = PRIMONTH, PRIQ, INTRM, and CREDCARDQ.  
If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in equation 1, and the trend is not 
significant, then the second equation will be used. If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
cannot be rejected and the intercept is not significant, the third equation would be used. If null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot still be rejected, it will be concluded that the time series is 
a pure random walk.  
The first differences of the time series will then be taken into consideration. If the time series 
becomes stationary (i.e. the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected), the time series is 
said to be difference stationary or integrated of order one. If it has to be differenced twice to 
make it stationary, it is said to be integrated of order two.  
Once the time series are tested for non-stationarity, the two sets of time series, monthly and 
quarterly, were tested for co-integration. Two variables are co-integrated if they have a long-term 
relationship. Therefore any probability of spurious regressions between cointegrated variables is 
0. The variables were also tested for cointegration in order to determine whether an error 
correction term would be needed in the later regressions or not, i.e., a model which reconciles 
both the short run and long-run behavior of these variables.   
Cointegration between two variables can be tested by using the Engle-Granger test. It should be 
noticed that this test can only be used if there are only two variables in question. For more than 
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two variables, the Johannsen test must be used.  Since this is a test to find if there are 
cointegrating relationship between INTRM and PRIM and PRIQ and CREDCARDQ, it is 
suitable to use the Engle-Granger Test. In the Engel-Granger test, one of the two variables is 
regressed against the other. The residual from this regression is, then, tested for unit root. If the 
residual is stationary, it is concluded that the two variables are cointegrated, and the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected.   
However, the Engel-Granger test may give contradictory results at times. As stated above, the 
Johannsen Test is another method of finding whether the two time series in question are 
cointegrated. Under this test, the null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between the 
time series in question. When we are dealing with n variables, the test results indicate if we 
can/cannot reject the null hypotheses of 1,2,..,(n-1) cointegrating equations.   
After the data have been tested twice for cointegration, using different tests, it could be 
concluded whether the time series are cointegrated or not.  
If either the PRIMONTH and INTRM or PRIQ and CREDCARDQ are found to be cointegrated, 
an Error Correction Model should be used to correct the disequilibrium that arises between the 
short and long run behavior of the included variables. The Error Correction term is used to 
connect the short run behavior of a variable to its long-run value. 
The next thing will be to analyze what factors affects PRIMONTH, INTRM, PRIQ and 
CREDCARDQ. Depending on whether or not these variables are stationary or not, the variables 
will be taken in either their level terms or their first differences. However, if they are co-
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integrated, the VECM model will be used, which takes into account the differences and not the 
level terms.  
The variables that might explain the changes in PRIMONTH and INTRM have been chosen 
following Walker’s (2010) lead. These variables are the Federal Funds Rate Monthly (FFM), 
INDEXM (the Business Borrowing Index Monthly released by the NFIB), and QBORSM 
(percentage of firms borrowing at least once every quarter, released by NFIB). These variables 
are either in their level values or differenced values. A unit root test will determine whether these 
variables are stationary or not. If they are stationary, their level values will be taken; otherwise, 
their differenced values will be used to set up the model, given that they are difference-stationary. 
The next step would be to use a VAR/VEC model to analyze the relationship between the 
dependent variables, PRIMONTH and INTRM and the exogenous variables FFM, INDEXM, 
and QBORSM. However, it needs to be established that the explanatory variables are exogenous. 
This can be done using the Block Granger Causality test. If at least one of these variables turns 
out to be endogenous, a co-integration test must be performed using the variables that are 
endogenous, PRIMONTH and INTRM. Since there would be more than two variables that need 
to be tested for co-integration, the Johansen test must be performed.  
The VAR model is similar to a system of simultaneous equations. The only difference is that, in 
the VAR model, the current values of the dependent variable are not present in the right hand 
side of the equation. The model doesn’t differentiate between exogenous and endogenous 
variables; therefore each system of equations will have the same number of regressors. The 
number of lagged terms will be the same throughout all systems of equations. Another important 
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reason for using the VAR model in this analysis is that with the use of this model, the impact of a 
variable can be determined as well as simultaneous impact multipliers.   
A critical requirement of the VAR model is that all the time series variables are stationary. If the 
variables mentioned above are not stationary or difference stationary, then the VAR model 
cannot be applied to this analysis. 
The system of VAR model will be as follows: 
   ΔPRIMONTHt  =    β1L   +  ∑

  βkLL    βkLS     ΔPRIMONTHt-k  + ∑

 α1S   Xt   
 Δ INTRMt                      β1S                                       βkSL    βkSS        ΔINTRMt-k                                              α2S 
    
                             +  ε1 
                                  ε2             
,where X is not an endogenous variable. As we have discussed before these variables, including 
PRIMONTH and INTRM are either in their level values or differences depending on whether 
they are stationary or not.  
Similarly, the system of VAREC equation would be: 
   ΔPRIMONTHt   =    β1L   +  ∑

  βkLL   βkLS    ΔPRIMONTHt-k      + ∑

 α1S   Xt   
 ΔINTRMt                         β1S                                       βkSL    βkSS        Δ INTRMt-k                                             α2S 
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                        +    µ1     EC t-1   +    ε1 
                              µ2                       ε2 
   
where EC is the Errror Correction term. EC
 t-1 =   PRIMt   + α0 + α1INTRMt  
The same analysis is going to be applied to the quarterly data, the monthly variables being 
transformed into quarterly variables with the exception of some variables. The proxy variable for 
the quantity of funds obtained by small firms on a quarterly basis is QCARDQ, which is the total 
credit card borrowing and is the sum of the revolving and non-revolving credit obtained. The 
data is released by the Federal Reserve. This replaces QBORSM.        
The next step will be to verify the long term relationship or the impact multipliers. To analyze 
the long term relationship between variables, all the lagged terms and the present terms must be 
equated. For instance, to see the long term relationship in the monthly data, the level terms of 
FFM, QBORSM, and INDEXM will be used. A restriction, PRIMONTHt = PRIMONTHt-1 = 
PRIMONTH
 t-1 and so on, will also be used to determine the long-run impact. (or  ΔPRIMONTHt  
= ΔPRIMONTHt-1 =  Δ PRIMONTH t-1 if PRIMONTH is non-stationary. The same procedure 
will be undertaken for INTRM and CREDCARDQ and PRIQ.          
Once the long-run values are calculated, the next step in the analysis would be to compare the 
data in periods of recession and periods of normalcy or growth. For this reason, a new binary 
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variable RECESSIONB is obtained, which has values of 1 during a recession and values of 0 
during periods of normalcy or growth. The data is obtained through NBER.  
The same analysis will be done, but now a dummy variable for the intercept would be used as 
well as the slope dummy variable. The values of the binary variable have been determined with 
respect to the data released by NBER identification of 2001 and 2007. The new binary variable, 
R, has a value of 1 during a recession and a 0 when there was no recession. The new variables 
will be R, R*QBORSM, R*INDEXM, and R*FFM for the monthly data, and R, R*QCARDQ, 
R*FFQ, and R*INDEXQ. The significance of these variables is going to be tested. Depending on 
whether these variables are significant, we can determine whether the cost of credit 
intermediation during a recession is different between small and large firms as well as it being 










   
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Unit root tests 
As we are discussing the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation for small and large 
firms, we need to check whether the proxy variables are stationary or not. We have used the 
Augmented-Dickey fuller test and followed the Doldado et al (1990) procedure and the results 
are follows: 
1. Variable: PRIMONTH 
Null Hypothesis (H0) = PRIMONTH has a unit root.  
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept      
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.809054 0.6961 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.087017 0.057785 1.505882 0.1340 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000322 0.000286 -1.124132 0.2626 
 
Here, it can be observed that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected; however the 
intercept and trend coefficients are not significant as well. 
B. Test for Unit root for intercept  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.416687 0.5731 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.032477 0.031413 1.033894 0.3027 
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Again, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected; however the intercept is not significant.  
C. Test for Unit root without intercept and trend 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.302243 0.1776 
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root can still be not rejected, and it can be observed that this time 
series is a pure random walk.  
D. Test for difference-stationarity  
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆PRIMONTH has a unit root.  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.265297 0.0000 
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that the PRIMONTH is 
difference-stationary, and that PRIMONTH is integrated of order 1, or I(1).  
2. Variable: INTRM  
Null Hypothesis(H0): INTRM has a unit root.  
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept      
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.573689 0.2930 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.489220 0.207229 2.360767 0.0195 
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@TREND(1998M01) -0.000923 0.000659 -1.400372 0.1634 
 
Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, but it can be observed that the 
intercept is significant at the 5% level.  
 
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.200990 0.6736 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.123607 0.131669 0.938771 0.3492 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not 
significant anymore.  
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.479160 0.1298 
 
Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that INTRM is non-stationary. The next step is to check whether 
INTRM is difference-stationary or not.  
D. Test for difference-stationarity  
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆INTRM has a unit root.  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -18.50543 0.0000 
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Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that INTRM is difference-
stationary, and that INTRM is integrated of order 1, or I(1).  
3. Variable: PRIQ 
Null Hypothesis(H0): PRIQ has a unit root.  
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept      
 
 t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.460392  0.3474 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.203792 0.095657 2.130435 0.0347 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000701 0.000471 -1.487400 0.1389 
 
Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, but it can be observed that the 
intercept is significant at the 5% level.  
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.954350 0.3069 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.084167 0.051985 1.619042 0.1074 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not 
significant anymore.  
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.263481 0.1895 
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Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that PRIQ is non-stationary. The next step is to check whether 
PRIQ is difference-stationary or not.  
D. Test for difference-stationarity  
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆PRIQ has a unit root.  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.331908 0.0000 
 
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that PRIQ is difference-
stationary, and that PRIQ is integrated of order 1, or I(1).  
4. Variable: CREDCARDQ  
Null Hypothesis (H0): CREDCARDQ has a unit root.  
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept    
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.588209 0.7938 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.406507 0.279276 1.455574 0.1474 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000338 0.000473 -0.713723 0.4764 
 
Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, and neither the intercept nor the 
trend is significant at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level.  
 
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.200990 0.6736 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.123607 0.131669 0.938771 0.3492 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not 
significant.  
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.308892 0.1756 
 
Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that CREDCARDQ is non-stationary. The next step is to check 
whether CREDCARDQ is difference-stationary or not.  
D. Test for difference-stationarity  
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆CREDCARDQ has a unit root.  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.80625 0.0000 
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that CREDCARDQ is 
difference-stationary, and that CREDCARDQ is integrated of order 1, or I(1).  
4.2 Tests for Cointegration  
4.2.1 Test for Cointegration between INTRM and PRIMONTH  
Since both INTRM and PRIMONTH are non-stationary, we need to check if they are 
cointegrated. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this needs to be done to check whether the 
VAR or the VEC model should be used in the analysis involving these two variables. Since there 
are only two variables that are in question, the Engel-Granger test is used.  As mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, PRIMONTH is be regressed on INTRM and the residuals are saved. In this 
analysis, the residuals are stored as EC. EC is then tested for non-stationarity.  Under the unit 
root test, the Null Hypothesis is that EC is non-stationary.  
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept      
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.297345 0.4326 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.045964 0.062522 0.735159 0.4633 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000535 0.000640 -0.835403 0.4048 
 
Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected; however the coefficients of the 
trend variable and intercept are not significant.  
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.218388 0.2006 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.000172 0.030045 0.005715 0.9954 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected; however, the intercept is not 
significant.  
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.225729  0.0255 
 
Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5% 
level. Therefore, it can be concluded that EC is stationary. Hence, INTRM and PRIMONTH are 
cointegrated.  Therefore, the VEC model should be used to analyze the factors that affect the 
changes in INTRM and PRIMONTH.  
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In order to confirm this result, the Johansen procedure (1988-91) is performed. The number of 
lags used for this test is 1. The results are summarized below: 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.151361  29.56054  15.49471  0.0002 
At most 1  0.013857  2.316294  3.841466  0.1280 
     
 
This test is used to examine the number of cointegrating equations. We can reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating equation between PRIMONTH and INTRM at the 0.1% level; 
however we cannot reject the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating equation between 
PRIMONTH and INTRM at the 10% level. Therefore, INTRM and PRIMONTH are uniquely 
cointegrated.  
4.2.2 Test for Cointegration between PRIQ and CREDCARDQ 
Since both PRIQ and CREDCARDQ are non-stationary, we need to check if they are 
cointegrated. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this needs to be done to check whether the 
VAR or the VEC model should be used in the analysis involving these two variables. Since there 
are only two variables that are in question, the Engel-Granger test is used.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, PRIQ is regressed on CREDCARDQ and the residuals are saved. In this 
analysis, the residuals are stored as ECQ. ECQ is then tested for non-stationarity.  
 
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept      
 t-Statistic Prob.* 




   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.022121 0.050167 0.440952 0.6598 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000374 0.000521 -0.717112 0.4743 
 
Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected; however the coefficients of the 
trend variable and intercept are not significant.   
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.101650 0.7147 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.009463 0.023983 -0.394575 0.6937 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not 
significant.  
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.106302 0.2431 
Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, the residuals are not stationary. It can be concluded that CREDCARDQ and PRIQ are 
not cointegrated. In order to confirm this result, the Johansen procedure (1988-91) is performed. 
The number of lags used for this test is 1. The results are summarized below: 
 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
 
None  0.019042  3.881462  15.49471  0.9129 
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation cannot be rejected. Therefore at the 5% level, 
there is no cointegration between PRIQ and CREDCARDQ 
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4.3 TESTS FOR EXOGENEITY 
We have to perform a test for exogeneity to ensure the exogeneity of FFM, QBORSM, and 
INDEXM for monthly data and FFQ, QCARDQ, and INDEXQ for quarterly data.  
 
4.3.1 Tests for exogeneity of the monthly variables 
A Block Granger Causality test for exogeneity was performed and the results of the test are as 
follows: 
a. Variable: FFM 
Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
D(FFM)  33.13260 2  0.0000 
D(INTRM)  2.178612 2  0.3364 
All  34.27836 4  0.0000 
 
Dependent variable: D(FFM)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIMONTH)  2.010149 2  0.3660 
D(INTRM)  1.251031 2  0.5350 
All  3.238653 4  0.5187 
 
 
Dependent variable: D(INTRM)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIMONTH)  13.51886 2  0.0012 
D(FFM)  1.774424 2  0.4118 
All  67.06046 4  0.0000 
 
    
 
Here, we can see the null hypothesis of ∆FFM not causing ∆PRIMONTH can be rejected at a 
very significant level, but the null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆FFM cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, there is only a one-way relationship between ∆PRIMONTH and ∆FFM. In 
the case of ∆INTRM and ∆FFM, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM not causing 
∆FFM and ∆FFM not causing ∆INTRM. Hence we can conclude that ∆FFM is not endogenous.  
 
b. Variable: QBORSM  
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Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)  
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(QBORSM)  0.459151 2  0.7949 
D(INTRM)  1.029635 2  0.5976 
All  1.409052 4  0.8426 
    
Dependent variable: D(QBORSM)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIMONTH)  4.079816 2  0.1300 
D(INTRM)  1.178268 2  0.5548 
All  4.625865 4  0.3279 
    
Dependent variable: D(INTRM)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIMONTH)  65.65220 2  0.0000 
D(QBORSM)  1.343829 2  0.5107 
All  66.45391 4  0.0000 
 
 
Here, we can see the null hypothesis of ∆QBORSM not causing ∆PRIMONTH, as well as the 
null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆QBORSM cannot be rejected . Therefore, there is 
no relationship between ∆PRIMONTH and ∆QBORSM. In the case of ∆INTRM and 
∆QBORSM, we can observe similar results. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM 
not causing ∆QBORSM and ∆QBORSM not causing ∆INTRM. We can conclude that 
∆QBORSM is not endogenous. 
  
c. Variable: INDEXM   
Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)  
 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(INDEXM)  2.118170 2  0.3468 
D(INTRM)  1.248083 2  0.5358 
    
All  3.078016 4  0.5449 
    
Dependent variable: D(INDEXM)  
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIMONTH)  9.825101 2  0.0074 
D(INTRM)  6.207281 2  0.0449 
All  16.71681 4  0.0022 
    
Dependent variable: D(INTRM)  
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Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
D(PRIMONTH)  67.09858 2  0.0000 
D(INDEXM)  2.786025 2  0.2483 
    
All  68.48541 4  0.0000 
    
 
Here, we can observe that the null hypothesis of ∆INDEXM not causing ∆PRIMONTH cannot be 
rejected; however, the null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆INDEXM can be rejected 
at a very significant level. Therefore, there is a one-way relationship between ∆INDEXM and 
∆PRIMONTH. We can also observe that the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM not causing ∆INDEXM 
can be rejected at the 5% level. However, the null hypothesis that ∆INDEXM not causing 
∆INTRM cannot be rejected. Therefore, there is a one-way relationship between ∆INDEXM and 
∆INTRM. We can conclude that ∆INDEXM is weakly exogenous.  
The test results indicate that all of the variables that we are concerned about (QBORSM, 
INDEXM, and FFM) are not endogenous.  
 
4.3.2 Tests for exogeneity for the quarterly variables. 
Variable: FFQ  
 
    
Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.013579 2  0.9932 
D(FFQ)  0.000151 2  0.9999 
All  0.014068 4  1.0000 
    
Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
D(PRIQ)  0.000628 2  0.9997 
D(FFQ)  0.000107 2  0.9999 
All  0.018871 4  1.0000 
    
Dependent variable: D(FFQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
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D(PRIQ)  0.000878 2  0.9996 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.013509 2  0.9933 
All  0.014402 4  1.0000 
    
The results indicate that we cannot reject the null hypotheses of ∆CREDCARDQ not causing 
∆FFQ, ∆FFQ not causing ∆CREDCARDQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆FFQ, and ∆FFQ not causing 
∆PRIQ. Hence we can conclude that ∆FFQ is not endogenous. 
Variable: QCARDQ 
Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.016341 2  0.9919 
D(QCARDQ)  0.663591 2  0.7176 
All  0.677567 4  0.9541 
    
Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIQ)  0.032764 2  0.9838 
D(QCARDQ)  0.471352 2  0.7900 
All  0.490172 4  0.9745 
    
Dependent variable: D(QCARDQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIQ)  0.633331 2  0.7286 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.224366 2  0.8939 
All  0.681696 4  0.9536 
 
The results are similar to those of ∆FFQ. We cannot reject the null hypotheses of ∆QCARDQ 
not causing ∆PRIQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆QCARDQ, ∆QCARDQ not causing ∆CREDCARDQ 
and ∆CREDCARDQ not causing ∆QCARDQ. Therefore, we can conclude that ∆QCARDQ is 
not endogenous.  
  
Variable: INDEXQ  
 
Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.011273 2  0.9944 
D(INDEXQ)  0.009720 2  0.9952 
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All  0.023638 4  0.9999 
    
Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIQ)  0.023127 2  0.9885 
D(INDEXQ)  0.006912 2  0.9965 
    
All  0.025677 4  0.9999 
    
Dependent variable: D(INDEXQ)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(PRIQ)  0.002468 2  0.9988 
D(CREDCARD
Q)  0.000856 2  0.9996 
All  0.004918 4  1.0000 
 
Again, the results are very similar to the results obtained above. We cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of ∆INDEXQ not causing ∆PRIQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆INDEXQ, ∆INDEXQ not 
causing ∆CREDCARDQ and ∆CREDCARDQ not causing ∆INDEXQ. Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that ∆INDEXQ is exogenous even though we can conclude that ∆INDEXQ is not 
endogenous.  
4.4 THE MODEL  
A critical requirement of the VAR/VAREC model is that all time series in question be stationary. 
Therefore the next step is to check whether the variables that might affect (the exogenous 
variable are stationary.     
4.4.1 Tests for stationarity of Monthly Variables 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Walker’s (2009) lead is followed. The variables are 
∆FFM, ∆QBORSM, and ∆INDEXM. We also need to check the stationarity of the level values 
of these variables in order to construct the impact multiplier model.  In order to check the 
stationarity of variables, the ADF-test for unit root, following the Doldado et al (1990) procedure. 
is performed. The test results are discussed below:  
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a. Variable: FFM 
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.800233 0.7005 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.054383 0.041939 1.296719 0.1966 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000350 0.000298 -1.173104 0.2425 
 
2. Test for unit root using intercept 
 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.363982 0.5988 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 




3. Test for unit root without trend and intercept 
 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.527638 0.1185 
 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in all three 
tests. The trend was not significant in the first test and the intercept was not significant in the 
first as well as the second test.  The p-value of the ADF test statistic in the third test is almost 
significant at the 10% level. This compelled us to perform other tests for stationarity. The DF-
GLS test was performed and the results are given below:   
 t-Statistic 
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic -3.466794 
Test critical values: 1% level   -3.508000 
 5% level   -2.970000 
 10% level   -2.680000 
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The results of the DF-GLS test indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. 
Thus, we can conclude that FFM is stationary.  
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆FFM is stationary or not. The ADF Test 
for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.40704 0.0000 
As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level. 
Therefore, ∆FFM is stationary.  
b. Variable: INDEXM  
 
1. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept  
 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.624057 0.0308 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 14.04378 3.883052 3.616687 0.0004 
@TREND(1998M01) 0.010669 0.004275 2.495673 0.0136 
 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5% level. 
The results also show that the constant as well as the trend are significant. Thus, we conclude 
that INDEXM is stationary.  
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆INDEXM is stationary or not. The ADF 
Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.931625 0.0000 
 
52 
   
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected. Hence, 
∆INDEXM is stationary.  
 
c. Variable: QBORSM  
1. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept  
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.060611 0.0003 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 14.69186 2.910157 5.048476 0.0000 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.009747 0.003994 -2.440516 0.0157 
 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5% level. 
The results also show that the constant as well as the trend are significant at the 5% level. Thus, 
we conclude that QBORSM is stationary.  
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆QBORSM is stationary or not. The 
ADF Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -14.56497 0.0000 
Again the test result shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very 
significant level. Therefore, ∆QBORSM is stationary.  
 
4.4.2 TESTS FOR STATIONARITY OF QUARTERLY VARIABLES 
The variables for the quarterly data analysis are ∆FFQ, ∆QCARDQ, and ∆INDEXQ. The Engle-
Granger test is performed to test the stationarity of the quarterly variables. The results from the 
test are discussed below: 
a. FFQ 
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1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.159381 0.5086 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.12460 0.077215 1.613676 0.1086 
@TREND(1998M01) -0.000743 0.000545 -1.362767 0.1749 
 
 
2. Test for unit root using intercept 
 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.670836 0.4442 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.029806 0.033610 0.886817 0.3765 
  
3. Test for unit root without trend and intercept 
 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.601402 0.1028 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in all three 
tests. The trend was not significant in the first test and the intercept was not significant in the 
first as well as the second test.  The p-value of the ADF test statistic in the third test is almost 
significant at the 10% level. This compelled us to perform other tests for stationarity. The DF-
GLS test and the KPSS test were performed and the results are given below:   
 
 t-Statistic 
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic -1.227099 
Test critical values: 1% level   -2.579404 
 5% level   -1.942818 
 10% level   -1.615392 
 
 LM-Stat. 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.713283 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
 5% level   0.463000 
 10% level   0.347000 
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The results of the DF-GLS test indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected, 
even at the 10% level. The results of the KPSS test show that the null hypothesis of stationarity 
can be rejected at the 5% level. Thus, we can conclude that FFQ is not stationary.  
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆FFQ is stationary or not. The ADF Test 
for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.894196 0.0001 
As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level. 
Therefore, ∆FFQ is stationary.  
b. ∆INDEXQ 
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.805761 0.1975 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 17.99574 6.403492 2.810300 0.0056 
@TREND(1998M01) 0.012594 0.005993 2.101246 0.0373 
The results from the ADF test indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be 
rejected. The trend and the intercept are significant at the 5% level.  
 
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆INDEXQ is stationary or not. The ADF 
Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.84523 0.0000 
As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level. 
Therefore, ∆INDEXQ is stationary.  
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c. QCARDQ 
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.077464 0.1154 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 39903.27 12363.02 3.227632 0.0016 
@TREND(1998M01) 233.4228 79.73325 2.927546 0.0040 
 
 
The results from the ADF test (where the intercept and the trend are highly significant) indicate 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level. However the p-value of 
the test statistic is very close to 10. This compelled us to perform stronger tests of non-
stationarity to confirm the results given by the ADF test. The Phillips-Perron test and the KPSS 
test were performed. The results from these tests are given and discussed below: 
   Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
Phillips-Perron test statistic -1.765794  0.3965 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.469691  
 5% level  -2.878723  
 10% level  -2.576010  
 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 
LM Stat 
 0.255670 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.216000 
 
The results from the Phillips-Perron test show that we cannot reject the null hypopthesis of non-
stationarity, whereas the results from the KPSS test indicate that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity at 1% significance. Hence, we can conclude that QCARDQ is not 
stationary.  
For the analysis of the short-run effects, we need to determine whether ∆QCARDQ is stationary 
or not.  The ADF test was used to test for stationarity. The results are given below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.144033 0.2294 
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Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, even at the 20% significance. 
This result is surprising, given that all other variables were difference stationary. This compels us 
to perform stronger tests for non-stationarity. The Phillips-Perron test and the KPSS test are 
applied to test whether the result shown by the ADF unit root test is reliable. The results from 
these two tests are discussed below: 
1. The Phillips-Perron Test Result 
 Adj. t-Statistic Prob.* 
Phillips-Perron test statistic -13.52452 0.0000 
The Phillips-Perron test clearly shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. The 
adjusted t-stat is highly significant.  
2. The KPSS Test Result 
 LM-Stat. 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.323012 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level    0.739000 
5% level    0.463000 
10% level  0.347000  
The KPSS test result is very consistent with the Phillips-Perron test. The null hypothesis of 
stationarity cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Therefore, we can conclude that ∆QCARDQ is 
stationary, and using the ADF test results would have led to a type II error.   
4.4.3 VEC MONTHLY MODEL  
A. Short Run Model 
Now that the requirements for the VEC model are satisfied in terms of the exogenous variables, 
the model can be set up. As discussed in the previous chapter, the model is:  
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   Δ PRIMONTHt  =   β1L  +  β2LL    β2LS    ΔPRIMONTHt-1   +  α1L ∆FFMt + α2L     ∆QBORSMt 
    Δ  INTRMt                    β1S          β2SL    β2SS        Δ INTRMt-1                     α2S                           α2S 
    
                        + α3L   ∆INDEXMt    +     µ1     EC t-1   +        ε1 
                             α3S                                    µ2                             ε2 
For this model, we have only used one lagged value of the dependent variable because the 
AIC/SBC criterion suggested it. The results of this model are shown and discussed below: 
The cointegrating equation is: EC
 t-1 = PRIMt-1 - 5.173 + 1.433INTRMt-1       
                                                                                                          (-24.22) 
 D(PRIMONTH) D(INTRM) 
D(PRIMONTH(-1)) 0.176182 0.034765 
 (0.03549) (0.15998) 
 [ 4.96425] [ 0.21731] 
   
D(INTRM(-1)) -0.004802 -0.319304 
 (0.01553) (0.07001) 
 [-0.30918] [-4.56085] 
   
C 0.000155 -0.018980 
 (0.00477) (0.02151) 
 [ 0.03238] [-0.88235] 
   
D(FFM) 0.807552 0.338442 
 (0.03135) (0.14130) 
 [ 25.7619] [ 2.39522] 
   
D(INDEXM) 0.001120 0.005567 
 (0.00228) (0.01026) 
 [ 0.49211] [ 0.54270] 
   
D(QBORSM) -0.002569 0.006897 
 (0.00174) (0.00784) 
 [-1.47659] [ 0.87945] 
Table 4.1: Results of the VECM Monthly Model   
Interpretations of the model: 
a. ∆PRIMONTH has a significant positive autoregressive relationship with its own lagged 
value, whereas ∆INTRM has a significant negative autoregressive relationship with its 
own lagged value.   
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b. ∆PRIMONTH and ∆INTRM both do not have significant autoregressive relationships 
with each other’s lagged values.  
c. ∆PRIMONTH and ∆INTRM both have significant positive relationship with ∆FFM. The 
coefficient of ∆FFM in the model concerning ∆PRIMONTH is almost 2.5 times the 
coefficient of ∆FFM in the model concerting ∆INTRM.   
d. The intercept is insignificant in both models.  
e. ∆PRIMONTH does not have a significant relationship with either ∆QBORSM or 
∆INDEXM. Similarly, ∆INTRM does not have a significant relationship with either 
∆QBORSM or ∆INDEXM. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between price 
and quantity in terms of monthly data.  
B. Impact multipliers and Long run equilibrium  
For the long run equilibrium values, we assume that ∆PRIMONTH
 t-1  = ∆PRIMONTHt = 
∆PRIMONTH.  Similarly we also assume that
 
∆INTRM
 t-1  = ∆INTRMt. = ∆INTRM.  The long 
run equilibrium coefficients are given below. In order to measure the long-run impact, we have 
taken level values of the exogenous variables as compared to taking the differenced values for 
the short-run analysis. Since INDEXM, QBORSM, as well as FFM are stationary time series, we 
were able to use the level values for the analysis.   








 0.0009116 0.0030699 
QBORSM
 -0.0071857 0.0040791 
FFM
 0.8055881 0.1101336 
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Interpretations of the Monthly Impact Multipliers: 
Since INDEXM is a proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by big firms, and QBORSM is a 
proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by small firms, it can be observed (table 4.2) that both 
small and large firms are paying higher prices for larger quantity of funds; however, the cost of 
credit intermediation is higher for the small firms relative to large firms.  The cross quantity 
elasticity coefficient is negative in the PRIMONTH model, whereas it is positive in the INTRM 
model. This suggests that the larger quantity small firms borrow, the lesser the cost of credit 
intermediation for large firms. On the other hand, these results also suggest that the larger 
quantity big firms borrow, the larger the cost of credit intermediation for small firms. An 
increase in FFM increases the cost of credit intermediation for small firms as well as big firms.   
 
4.4.3 VAR QUARTERLY MODEL  
The requirements for a VAR Quarterly Model are met in terms of the exogenous variables. 
Therefore, the model can be set up. As we have discussed in the last chapter, the VAR model is 
as follows: 
   ΔPRIQt          =     β1L    +    β2LL    β2LS              ΔPRIQt-1                       +  α1L   ∆FFQt  +   
 Δ CREDCARDt                       β1S             β2SL    β2SS            ΔCREDCARDQt-1                  α1S                                
    
                             α2L    ∆QCARDQt   +    α3L  ∆INDEXQt    +      ε1 
                             α2S                                    α3S                                    ε2 
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In order to get consistent and comparable results with the monthly data, a lag length of one is 
taken. The VAR output is given on the next page.  
 D(PRIQ) D(CREDCARDQ) 
D(PRIQ(-1)) -0.001814  0.003488 
  (0.01912)  (0.05656) 
 [-0.09488] [ 0.06166] 
   
D(CREDCARDQ(-1)) -0.001710  0.003288 
  (0.02549)  (0.07541) 
 [-0.06708] [ 0.04359] 
   
C -0.006098  0.011727 
  (0.00571)  (0.01688) 
 [-1.06882] [ 0.69463] 
   
D(QCARDQ)  1.12E-06 -6.06E-06 
  (5.5E-07)  (1.6E-06) 
 [ 2.04198] [-3.75210] 
   
D(INDEXQ)  0.007741 -0.009009 
  (0.00204)  (0.00605) 
 [ 3.78791] [-1.48978] 
   
D(FFQ)  0.931686  0.239644 
  (0.01758)  (0.05203) 
 [ 52.9837] [ 4.60570] 
Table 4.3 Results from the VAR Quarterly Model 
Model Interpretations :  
a. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both do not have significant autoregressive relationships 
with their own lagged values.  
b. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both do not have significant autoregressive relationships 
with each other’s lagged values.  
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c. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both have significant positive relationship with ∆FFQ. The 
coefficient of ∆FFQ in the model concerning ∆PRIQ is almost 4 times the coefficient of 
∆FFQ in the model concerting ∆CREDCARDQ.   
d. The intercept is insignificant in both models.  
e. ∆PRIMONTH has a significant positive relationship with ∆INDEXQ as well as 
∆QCARDQ. On the other hand, ∆CREDCARDQ has a significant negative relationship 
with ∆QCARDQ but has an insignificant relationship with ∆INDEXQ. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the market for funds for small and big firms is not segmented.  
B. Impact multipliers and Long run equilibrium  
For the long run equilibrium values, we assume that ∆PRIQ
 t-1  = ∆PRIQt = ∆PRIQ.  Similarly we 
also assume that
 
∆CREDCARDQt-1  = ∆CREDCARDQt. = ∆CREDCARDQ.  The long run 
equilibrium coefficients are given below. We could not take the level values to measure the long-
run impact of the quarterly exogenous variables on the changes of cost of credit because these 
variables were not stationary.  
  Table 4.4 The Quarterly Impact Multipliers 
Interpretations of the Quarterly Impact Multipliers: 
Since INDEXQ is a proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by big firms, and QCARDQ is a 







 0.9300 0.2405 
∆QCARDQ
 1.1179E-6 -6.0812E-6 
∆INDEXQ
 0.0074 -0.0090 
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paying a higher price for a larger amount of funds, whereas small firms are paying lower price 
for a larger amount of funds. The cross quantity elasticity coefficient is positive in the PRIQ 
model, whereas it is negative in the CREDCARDQ model. This suggests that the more quantity 
small firms borrow, the higher the cost of credit intermediation for large firms. On the other hand, 
the larger the amount of funds borrowed by the larger firms are, the lesser the small firms have to 
pay for a certain amount of funds.  An increase in FFM increases the cost of credit 
intermediation for small firms as well as big firms; however the change in prices for large firms 
is about 3 times the change in prices for small firms, which is consistent with the monthly 
variable analysis. These results do contradict the financial accelerator hypothesis, but it also must 
be noted that we used the differences rather than level values to estimate the impact multipliers.  
 
4.4 IMPACT OF RECESSION ON THE MODEL 
As we have discussed in previous chapters, the cost of credit intermediation increases for small-
sized firms. This idea is consistent with the idea of the financial accelerator and the credit 
rationing model, which state that an economic downturn gets amplified due to the increase in 
cost of credit intermediation. Therefore, it is of great interest to determine whether the cost of 
credit intermediation does increase during a recession, and whether the difference between the 
cost of credit intermediation for small firms and big firms is going to rise. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the same analysis was repeated with the use of the dummy variable. The t-





   
4.4.1 Effects of Recession on Monthly Data   
                Intercept Card Rate Equation Prime Rate Equation 
 ∆(PRIMONTH) ∆(INTRM) ∆(PRIMONTH) ∆(INTRM) ∆(PRIMONTH) ∆(INTRM) 
R -3.11 -0.36     
R* ∆INDEXM -3.06 -0.37   1.34 -0.17 
R* ∆QBORSM -3.30 -0.42 -1.59 -0.44   
R* Both -3.24 -0.21   1.20 -0.21 
Note: The t-statistics are rounded off to 2 decimal places 
Table 4.5: T-statistics for recessionary monthly binary model  
 
For the monthly model, wherever the t-statistics are significant, the credit prices are lower during 
the recession. The t-statistics of the intercept model are significant at the 1% level for 
∆PRIMONTH. Therefore, the credit prices for large firms decrease during a recession. On the 
other hand, the credit prices for ∆INTRM do not change since none of the recession coefficients 
for ∆INTRM are significant even at the 10% level. The other recession coefficients for 
∆PRIMONTH are not significant at the 10% level. Thus, it can be concluded that in a recession, 
the credit prices for large firms decrease and they stay the same for small firms, hence widening 
the difference in their cost of credit intermediation.   
 
4.4.1 Effects of Recession on Quarterly Data  
                Intercept Card Rate Equation Prime Rate Equation 
 ∆PRIQ ∆CREDCARDQ ∆PRIQ ∆CREDCARDQ ∆PRIQ ∆CREDCARDQ 
R -6.48 -0.43     
R* ∆INDEXQ -6.13 -1.09   2.00 -4.04 
R* ∆QCARDQ -6.42 0.45 0.38 0.45   
R* Both -6.07 -1.06 0.43 0.36 2.00 -4.02 
Note: The t-statistics are rounded off to 2 decimal places 




   
For the quarterly model, the credit prices show mixed responses to recession. The t-statistics of 
the intercept model are negative and are significant at the 1% level for ∆PRIQ. Therefore, the 
credit prices for large firms decrease during a recession. In the quarterly prime rate models, on 
the other hand, the t-statistics for ∆PRIQ are positive and significant, which implies that credit 
prices increase for large firms in a recession. This is not a matter of concern for us since the t-
statistics for ∆PRIQ in the intercept model are greater, in absolute terms, than the t-statistics of 
∆PRIQ in the prime rate equation. Thus, the net effect is going to be negative. On the other hand, 
the t-statistics for ∆CREDCARDQ are negative and significant at the 1% level. However, the R-
Squared values of these models were so low (0.002 and 0.096,), as compared to the PRIQ model 
that we can ignore the effect of the recession on the prices for credit for small firms. As a result 
we conclude that the credit prices for large firms decrease and stay constant for small firms, 
hence widening the difference in their cost of credit intermediation during a recession. These 




























   
CONCLUSION 
By and large, both the monthly and quarterly results reported in this thesis are consistent with the 
theories described in the earlier chapters. In both cases, the cost of credit intermediation for small 
firms and large firms responded to the same economic and financial factors. In addition, the 
reported estimates also suggest that the impact of economic recession on the cost of credit 
intermediation was significant. The results suggest that the cost of credit intermediation decrease 
in a recession; however the decrease appears to be larger in the case of big firms as compared to 
that of small firms.    
The changes in the cost of credit intermediation for small firms as well as large firms were 
affected by changes in the federal funds rate; however, the reported estimates suggest that the 
positive change in the federal funds induces a bigger increase in the price of credit for large firms 
as compared to the price of credit for small firms. In the analysis for the monthly data, the 
estimates suggest that the price of credit, for both small and large firms, did not respond to the 
changes in the quantity of credit borrowed in the short-run.  As a result, it was not possible to   
refute the null hypothesis that the market for credit intermediation is not segmented between 
small and large firms.  
To determine which variables affected the cost of credit intermediation for the monthly data in 
the long-run, this study considered the level values of the variables. The results from the analysis 
indicate that the quantity borrowed by large firms had a positive impact on the cost of credit 
intermediation for both types of firms, and the impact was greater for the small firms as 
compared to the larger firms. In addition, the results suggest that an increase in the quantity 
borrowed by smaller firms resulted in a decrease in the cost of credit intermediation for larger 
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firms, but led to an increase in the cost of credit for small firms. This result is consistent with the 
financial accelerator model and the credit rationing model. It also clearly suggests that the credit 
markets for small firms and large firms are not segmented in the long run.   
For the quarterly data, the cost of credit intermediation for large and small firms responded to 
similar economic and financial factors in the short-run. The cost of credit intermediation for both 
types of firms had a significant positive relationship with changes in the Federal Funds Quarterly 
Rate. However, a positive change in the Federal Funds Rate induced a greater rise in the cost of 
credit intermediation for large firms as compared to the cost of credit intermediation for small 
firms.  This result is consistent with those obtained from the monthly data analysis.  
In terms of the cost of credit intermediation responding to changes in the quantity borrowed for 
the quarterly data, it was shown that a positive change in the quantity borrowed by large firms 
increases their cost of credit intermediation. In addition, changes in the cost of credit for small 
firms had a negative relationship with changes in the quantity borrowed by small firms but a 
positive relationship with the quantity borrowed by large firms. These results are puzzling. The 
theories argue that it should be the opposite because of the imperfections in the credit market.  
The long-run impact multipliers reported for the quarterly data could not be estimated because 
the variables associated with the quantity borrowed were not stationary. Therefore, the 
differenced values were taken into consideration, and the results obtained are consistent with the 
results obtained for the short-run for the quarterly data.   
The introduction of the effects of economic recession into the model generated results that were, 
by and large, consistent with the theories discussed in this paper. For the monthly data, the 
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estimates suggest that a recession decreases the price of credit for large firms, but did not change 
the cost of credit intermediation for the small firms. Therefore, the reported estimates suggest 
that during a recession the gap between the prices of credit for small firms and large firms 
widened.   
The results obtained from the impact of economic recession for the quarterly data were very 
similar to those obtained for the monthly data; however, there were some anomalies in the 
reported estimates. In general, they suggest that the cost of credit intermediation decrease during 
a recession. The decrease appears to be greater in the case of the cost of credit intermediation for 
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